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GOVERNANCE AND BIOSECURITY:
STRENGTHENING SECURITY AND OVERSIGHT OF THE
NATION'S BIOLOGICAL AGENT LABORATORIES'
Michael Greenberger, * Talley Kovacs, Marita Mike, *
ABSRACT
Since the advent of the Anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001, the United
States has been confronted with a serious policy conundrum. On the one
hand, we have strengthened programs that encourage the use of our best
scientific resources to develop countermeasures to the weaponization of
highly dangerous biopathogens. On the other hand, research on those
countermeasures requires the use of the very biopathogens we seek to de-
feat. There have been many mishaps in the handling of those pathogens,
which raises the frightening prospect that the research may be as (or more)
dangerous than bioterrorist acts themselves. Indeed, the Anthrax attacks
that motivated increased funding and research on biopathogens now seems
likely to have been caused by research being conducted in the United
States on Anthrax, an infectious disease caused by the bacteria Bacillus
anthracis. Leaving aside which researcher evaded the security measures of
the United States Army at its Fort Detrick laboratory facility, the forensic
evidence appears very strong that an "insider" obtained the bacteria to
perpetrate the 2001 attacks at that facility.
It is the thesis of this article that the United States can improve secu-
rity measures at those biosafety level ("BSL") laboratories that handle the
1 This article was adapted from Congressional Testimony delivered by Michael Greenberger on September
22, 2009 before the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security. The
authors extend their gratitude to the following Juris Doctor Candidates at the University of Maryland for
their commendable research and editing efforts in drafting the article: Elizabeth Murray, J.D. Candidate
2010, Christopher Webster, J.D. Candidate 2010, and Meaghan McCann, J.D. Candidate 2010.
* Michael Greenberger, J.D., is the Founder and Director of the University of Maryland Center for Health
and Homeland Security, as well as a professor at the University of Maryland School of Law.
** Talley Kovacs, J.D., M.B.A. is a Law and Policy Analyst at CHHS.
*** Dr. Marita Mike, M.D., J.D. is the Health Director of CHHS and Hospitalist at Union Memorial Hospi-
tal.
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most dangerous pathogens ("BSL-3" and "BSL-4" labs), so that laborato-
ries can develop countermeasures to potential bioterror attacks without
having that research inherently pose a threat to national security. This ar-
ticle makes recommendations in aid of such a policy. To put the recom-
mendations in context, the article establishes the following foundational
evidence: (1) a summary of statutory and regulatory mandates addressed to
BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs; (2) a summary of leading reports that have been
issued recommending improved biosecurity measures at those labs; and
(3) a brief description of biosafety mishaps at BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs that
have provoked the controversy at hand.
We conclude that Congress should enact legislation that will: (1) re-
place the present fragmented federal agency oversight system for biosafety
laboratories by creating consolidated oversight responsibilities within a
single agency; (2) through this agency, establish an accreditation system
for BSL laboratories to ensure that they are operated safely and securely;
(3) establish a reporting system that ensures all laboratory mishaps are
promptly reported to, and promptly reviewed by, the oversight agency so
that the facts pertaining to these mishaps can be made available in a mean-
ingful way to other laboratories in a "lessons learned" modality; (4) im-
prove the process of personnel reliability assessments; and (5) recognize
that a "one-size fits all" model of compliance is too great a burden on most
non-military BSL laboratories, and thus foster a private sector model of
strong, but appropriate and practical, biosecurity procedures for those BSL
labs.
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The October 2001 Anthrax attacks resulted in eleven cases of cutane-
ous anthrax, eleven cases of inhalational anthrax, five deaths and an over-
whelming nationwide fear about public safety and the threat of biological
attacks.2 These deadly exposures sparked an increased scientific effort to
develop medical countermeasures that could prevent or ameliorate the dis-
persion of biological agents that would likely be used as part of a terrorist
attack.' Since the attacks, funding for biodefense research has substan-
tially increased. In 2001, the National Institutes of Health Biodefense Re-
2 Ronald Atlas, Biosecurity concerns: Changing the face of academic research, 12 JOURNAL OF CHEMICAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY, at 15, 17 (2005), available at www.sciencedirect.com (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009).
3 Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, The Danger Within, SCIENCE, Mar. 6, 2009 at 1283, available at http://www.
sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/323/5919/1282 (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009).
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search Funding totaled $25 million, but by 2005 had increased to $1.7 bil-
lion.4 The increased funding directly correlates to an increased number of
researchers and laboratories working with deadly biological agents.
Prior to the 2001 Anthrax incidents, concerns in the scientific and
regulatory community about improper handling of the biological agents
that are used for research focused on the possession, use, and transport of
those agents. However, as awareness grew of the highly dangerous and po-
tentially lethal threats that these agents posed, the regulatory focus shifted
to: (1) regulating access to the most deadly agents; (2) reporting security
issues at laboratories where research on deadly agents was conducted; and
(3) developing codes of conduct for these laboratories. The Secretary of
the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") and
the Secretary of the USDA chose "Select Agents" using statutory criteria.7
The identified Select Agents pose high threats to human, plant and animal
life because of their methods of transmission, potential for misuse, and
toxicity. Upon the heels of this new legislation and regulation, numerous
studies have been conducted on the issue of biosecurity. The National
Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity ("NSABB"), The Commission on
the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism ("The Commission"),
and the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") have each been inde-
pendently charged with investigating different aspects of biosecurity at
BSL laboratories.9 Exposures and incidents at laboratories such as those at
Texas A&M University have drawn widespread attention to the safety and
security in university laboratories. 0
4 Atlas, supra note 2, at 16.
5 Id. at 15.
6 Caitriona McLeish & Paul Nightingale, Biosecurity, bioterrorism and the governance of science: The
increasing convergence of science and security policy, 36 RESEARCH POLICY 1635, 1639 (2007), available
at www.sciencedirect.com (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009).
7 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. § 262a
(2006) [hereinafter "PHBPA"]; see also 42 C.F.R. § 73 (2009) (relating to public health), see also 9 C.F.R.
§ 121 (2009) (relating to animals), see also 7 C.F.R. § 331 (2009) (relating to plants).
8 Id.
9 Dennis Kasper, Report to the NSABB: NSABB Working Group on Personnel Reliability: Preliminary
Findings and Recommendations, National Science Advisory Board, December 2008, at slide 6, [hereinafter
"Kasper"] available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/nsabb-past-meetings.html#dec2008 (follow "Per-
sonnel Reliability Working Group: Preliminary Findings and Recommendations" hyperlink); Bob Graham,
et. al, World at Risk: The Report of The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terror-
ism (Vintage Books: A Division of Random House, Inc. 2008); U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Bio-
safety Laboratories: Perimeter Security Assessment of the Nation's Five BSL-4 Laboratories, (2008),
[hereinafter "BSL-4"], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081092.pdf (last accessed Sept. 21,
2009).
10 Letter from Robbin Weyant, Director, Division of Select Agents and Toxins, Coordinating Office for
Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response to Richard Ewing, Responsible Official, Texas A&M
2010] 79
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II. IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS
Based on review of the legislation and Select Agent regulations re-
garding BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories," the NSABB, Commission, and
GAO reports, 12 and reports of incidents and accidental exposures,13 the fol-
lowing problems plague biosafety and biosecurity:
* The regulatory structure for BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories is
fragmented across several federal agencies.
* Incident reporting of biosafety and biosecurity incidents at
BSL- 3 and BSL-4 laboratories is not centralized.
* Incident review does not produce protocol modification in a
timely manner across all laboratories, thereby inhibiting col-
laboration on best practices.
* Physical BSL laboratory facilities do not require accredita-
tion.
* Protocols that are in place to gauge personnel reliability could
be improved. There is great interest in increasing personnel
reliability within research laboratories, but to date, some
compliance measures may be compromising the efficient pro-
duction of social benefits gained from investigation of the Se-
lect Agents because of overly broad screening measures for
personnel and a deterrent effect on potential hires.
* The "one-size fits all" model of compliance is too great a bur-
den on most non-military level laboratories. Military labora-
tories have heightened security models, but military level se-
curity is not practical for university laboratories. A private
sector model of appropriate and practical biosecurity proce-
dures for those BSL labs is vital.
University (Aug. 31, 2007) [hereinafter "Texas A&M"] available at http://www.sunshine-
project.org/TAMU/CDCTAMUReport.pdf (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009).
11 PHBPA, supra note 7; see also 42 C.F.R. § 73 (2009) (relating to public health), see also 9 C.F.R. § 121
(2009) (relating to animals), see also 7 C.F.R. § 331 (2009) (relating to plants).
12 Kasper, supra note 9; BSL-4, supra note 9.
13 Texas A&M, supra note 10.
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1111. SUPPORTING MATERIAL
A. Pertinent Statutory Review: Oversight of BSL laboratories
is fragmented across multiple agencies. The following statutory
framework provides an overview of BSL regulation.
1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA") required HHS to promulgate regulations to identify biological
agents that pose a potential threat to public health and safety and to iden-
tify protocols governing the transfer of those agents.14 The resultant regu-
lations established the Center for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC")
Laboratory Registration/Select Agent Transfer Program." The regulations
included six essential provisions: (1) a list of select agents that posed a se-
vere threat to public health and safety; (2) required registration of facilities
prior to any domestic transfer of named agents; (3) transfer documenta-
tion; (4) accountability mechanisms; (5) disposal requirements; and (6)
exemptions.
The AEDPA explicitly addressed the possibility of weaponization of
biological agents.16  The promulgated regulations mandate that facilities
safeguard these agents from individuals who might use them in acts of
domestic or international terrorism by identifying hazardous biological
agents and requiring registration of laboratories that transport hazardous
biological agents."
2. The PATRIOT Act
The PATRIOT Act, which was passed in October 2001, defines "Re-
stricted Persons" who are statutorily ineligible for clearance from the De-
14 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 511, 110 Stat. 1214
[hereinafter "AEDPA"]. (After the Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred E. Murrah Building in April
1995, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 in October 1996. HHS
delegated authority for operating the Laboratory Registration and Select Agents Tracking Program, a provi-
sion of the act, to CDC. Regulations under the act were promulgated under 42 CFR 72.6. The biological
agent provisions of AEDPA were amended by Sec. 351A of the PHBPA, See Sec. 201 of Public Law 107-
188.)
15 See 42 C.F.R. § 72 (2002). (The regulations became effective on April 15, 1997.)
16 AEDPA, supra note 14.
17 Id.
2010] 81
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partment of Justice ("DOJ") to work with Select Agents.1 A Restricted
Person is an individual who is: under indictment, or has been convicted of
a felony; a fugitive; an unlawful user of a controlled substance; an unlaw-
ful or illegal alien; a national of a country determined to sponsor or sup-
port terrorism; a person who has been dishonorably discharged from the
military; or one who has been committed to a mental institution. 9 The
PATRIOT Act does not provide exemptions from these criteria and no ap-
peal process is in place for "Restricted Person" determinations. Many
medical research institutions have asserted that the inability to exempt for-
eign researchers, who might be precluded by this DOJ investigation, on a
case-by-case basis has dramatically impeded the development of medical
countermeasures necessary to combat bioterrorist attacks.2 0
Additionally, Section 817 of the PATRIOT Act expands the govern-
ment's ability to prosecute persons suspected of possessing biological
agents to be used for terrorist acts, to fine or imprison (for up to ten years)
a person who "knowingly possesses any biological agent, toxin, or deliv-
ery system of a type or in a quantity that, under the circumstances, is not
reasonably justified by a prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or
other peaceful purpose."2 1
18 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 817, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended 18 USC § 175b
(2009) [hereinafter PATRIOT Act] (The statute defines a "Restricted Person" as one who"(A) is under
indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding I year; (B) has been convicted in
any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year; (C) is a fugitive from justice;
(D) is an unlawful user of any controlled substance(as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances
Act (21 U.S.C. 802)); (E) is an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States; (F) has been adjudicated
as a mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution; (G) is an alien (other than an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who is a national of a country as to which the Secretary of
State, pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C.App. 2405(j)), Section
620A of chapter I of part M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), or Section 40(d) of
Chapter 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)), has made a determination (that remains in
effect) that such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism; or (H) has been
discharged from the Armed Services of the United States under dishonorable conditions.")
19 Id.
20 McLeish & Nightingale, supra note 6 at 1641. ("In 2005, 40 leading scientific societies and higher edu-
cation associations released a joint statement calling for modifications to restrictions on foreign researchers
because the US 'risk[s) irreparable damage to our competitive advantage in attracting international stu-
dents, scholars, scientists, and engineers, and ultimately to our nations' global leadership.").
21 PATRIOT Act, supra note 18; see also Genevieve J. Knezo, Possible Impacts ofMajor Counter Terror-
ism Security Actions on Research, Development, and Higher Education, Congressional Research Service
Report, Apr. 8, 2002, at 19, available at http://74.125.113.132/search?q-cache:jVdHCeEolgsJ:www.
au.af.mil/aulawc/awcgate/crs/rl31354.pdf+critique+of+Sec.+511 +of+the+Antiterrorism+and+Effective+
Death+Penalty+Act+of+1996&cd=8&hl=en&ct-clnk&gl-us&client=firefox-a (last accessed Sept. 21,
2009) ("Section 817 of P.L. 107-56, the PATRIOT/USA antiterrorism act expanded the government's abil-
ity to prosecute persons suspected of possessing biological agents to be used for terrorist acts, and ad-
dressed some of the limitations perceived in the 1996 law. The PATRIOT Act amended the biological
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3. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Re-
sponse Act of 2002 ("PHBPA") requires HHS to establish and regulate a
list of biological agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe
threat to public health and safety. It also expands the Select Agent regula-
tions and imposes a registration obligation on all entities that possess, use,
or transport Select Agents. This statute expanded the scope of the AEDPA
provisions on biological agents. The Select Agent regulations that both
HHS and USDA promulgate (as PHBPA requires) are described in more
detail below.
4. Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002
The Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 ("ABPA") re-
quires the USDA to establish and regulate a list of biological agents that
have the potential to pose a severe threat to animal health and safety, plant
health and safety, or to the safety of animal or plant products.22 Both the
PHBPA and the ABPA require the review and republication of the lists of
Select Agents and toxins on at least a biennial basis.23
B. Regulations and Advisory Guidelines
1. Select Agent regulations
As the PHBPA directs, HHS and USDA have expanded the Select
24Agent regulations to encompass possession and use of Select Agents.
weapons statute to fine or imprison (for up to 10 years) a person who 'knowingly possesses any biological
agent, toxin, or delivery system of a type or in a quantity that, under the circumstances, is not reasonably
justified by a prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purpose."')
22 Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 647 [hereinafter
ABPA].
23 Id. (The first publication of the Select Agents Regulations 42 C.F.R. § 73, 7 C.F.R. § 331, 9 C.F.R. §
121 in the Federal Register occurred on March 18, 2005. The Final Rules were published in the Federal
Register on March 18, 2005 and became effective on April 18, 2005. The Animal and Plant Health Inspec-
tion Service (APHIS) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published Final Rules in
the Federal Register on October 16, 2008 that complete the biennial review and republication of the lists of
Select Agents and toxins. The Final Rules published on October 16 became effective on November 17,
2008.
24 The Select Agent Regulations are 42 C.F.R. § 73 (2009) (relating to public health), 9 C.F.R. § 121
(2009) (relating to animals), and 7 C.F.R. § 331 (2009) (relating to plants) [hereinafter "Select Agent Regu-
lations"]. The Select Agent Rules require that all entities that possess, use, or transport Select Agents must
register with either the Center for Disease Control and Prevention or the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Also, personnel who have access to these materials must undergo a Security Risk Assessment. There are
832010]
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There are three sets of relevant regulations: one promulgated by the CDC
for the protection of public health25 and two promulgated by the Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service ("APHIS") relating to animals2 6 and
plants.2 7 Each set of regulations establish essentially the same require-
ments with regard to Select Agents, including: (1) agents must registered
and an eligible official must be assigned responsibility for them; (2) access
must be restricted; (3) a security plan must be established; (4) a biocon-
tainment and biosafety plan must be established; (5) experiments must be
restricted; (6) an incident response plan must be established; (7) biocon-
tainment and security training must be provided; (8) transfers of the agents
must be limited; (9) proper records must be maintained; (10) facility in-
spections by APHIS and/or CDC must be allowed; and (11) reports must
be filed if agents are lost or stolen.2 8
When adding a biological agent to the Select Agent list, HHS and
USDA must consider: the effect of exposure on human health; the degree
of contagiousness; availability of treatments or immunizations; and any
other criteria particularly addressing the potential exposure of vulnerable
populations.2 9 If denominated as Select Agents, the biological agents must
be registered with the National Select Agent Registry.30  As of the last bi-
ennial review in November of 2008 there were thirty-six Selected Agents
listed by HHS, twenty-four by USDA, seven USDA Plan Protection and
Quarantine ("PPQ") agents, and ten overlapping agents where oversight
authority and responsibility is shared between the two agencies.3
civil and criminal penalties for non-compliance with the Select Agent Rules.
25 See 42 C.F.R. § 73 (2009) (relating to public health).
26 See 9 C.F.R. § 121 (2009) (relating to animals).
27 See 7 C.F.R. § 331 (2009) (relating to plants).
28 Select Agent Regulations, supra note 24.
29 PHBRA, supra note 7. (criteria for placing an agent or toxin on the Select Agent Registry).
30 National Select Agent Registry, http://www.selectagents.gov/index.html (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009).
31 See http://www.selectagents.gov/Select%20Agents%20and%20Toxins%2OList.htm (last visited Sept.
21, 2009) (HHS Select Agents and Toxins: Abrin, Botulinum neurotoxins, Botulinum neurotoxin producing
species of Clostridium, Cercopithecine herpesvirus I (Herpes B virus), Clostridium perfringens epsilon
toxin, Coccidioides posadasii/Coccidioides immitis, Conotoxins, Coxiella burnetii, Crimean-Congo haem-
orrhagic fever virus, Diacetoxyscirpenol, Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus, Ebola virus, Francisella tu-
larensis, Lassa fever virus, Marburg virus, Monkeypox virus, Reconstructed replication competent forms of
the 1918, pandemic influenza virus containing any portion of the, coding regions of all eight gene segments
(Reconstructed 1918 Influenza virus), Ricin, Rickettsia prowazekii, Rickettsia rickettsii, Saxitoxin, Shiga-
like ribosome inactivating proteins, Shigatoxin, South American Haemorrhagic Fever viruses, Flexal, Gua-
narito, Junin, Machupo, Sabia, Staphylococcal enterotoxins, T-2 toxin, Tetrodotoxin, Tick-borne encephali-
tis complex (flavi) viruses, Central European Tick-borne encephalitis, Far Eastern Tick-borne encephalitis,
Kyasanur Forest disease, Omsk Hemorrhagic Fever, Russian Spring and Summer encephalitis, Variola ma-
jor virus (Smallpox virus), Variola minor virus (Alastrim), Yersinia pestis; USDA Select Agents And Tox-
ins: African horse sickness virus, African swine fever virus, Akabane virus, Avian influenza virus (highly
84
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2. Security Risk Assessments
Security Risk Assessments ("SRA") are mandated by the PHBPA for
every individual who seeks to work with Select Agents.32  Using the crite-
ria from the PATRIOT Act, the SRA is intended to preempt "Restricted
Persons" from gaining access to these potentially harmful biological
agents.33 APHIS and CDC work with the Criminal Justice Information
System ("CJIS") at the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") to identify
individuals who should be precluded from gaining access to select agents
and toxins.34 The SRA most notably involves comparing an applicant's
fingerprints against criminal and terrorist databases and must be renewed
every three or five years.
Recently, the CDC notified the NSABB that the FBI has begun to bi-
annually crosscheck approved individuals against specified databases to
verify that the individuals have not slid into a restricted category. 36 This
interim measure is crucial in maintaining a current accounting of all indi-
viduals involved in work with Select Agents and toxins given that applica-
tions for renewal are only due every five years. However, the FBI's in-
terim crosscheck is not presently required by law or regulation.
Personnel screening processes differ between military and private
sector research facilities. Some military research laboratories have insti-
pathogenic), Bluetongue virus (exotic), Bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent, Camel pox virus, Classi-
cal swine fever virus, Ehrlichia ruminantium (Heartwater), Foot-and-mouth disease virus, Goat pox virus,
Japanese encephalitis virus, Lumpy skin disease virus. Malignant catarrhal fever virus(Alcelaphine herpes-
virus type 1), Menangle virus, Mycoplasma capricolum subspecies capripneumoniae (contagious caprine
pleuropneumonia),Mycoplasma mycoides subspecies mycoides small colony (Mmm SC) (contagious bo-
vine pleuropneumonia), Peste des petits ruminants virus, Rinderpest virus, Sheep pox virus, Swine vesicu-
lar disease virus, Vesicular stomatitis virus (exotic): Indiana subtypes VSV-IN2, VSV-IN3, Virulent New-
castle disease virus 1); USDA Plant Protection And Quarantine (Ppq) Select Agents And Toxins:
Peronosclerospora philippinensis (Peronosclerospora sacchari), Phoma glycinicola (formerly Pyrenochaeta
glycines), Ralstonia solanacearum race 3, biovar 2, Rathayibacter toxicus, Sclerophthora rayssiae var zeae,
Synchytrium endobioticum, Xanthomonas oryzae, Xylella fastidiosa (citrus variegated chlorosis strain);
Overlap Select Agents And Toxins: Bacillus anthracis, Brucella abortus, Brucella melitensis, Brucella suis,
Burkholderia mallei (formerly Pseudomonas mallei), Burkholderia pseudomallei (formerly Pseudomonas
pseudomallei), Hendra virus, Nipah virus, Rift Valley fever virus, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus.
32 Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262, et seq., amended by PHBPA, supra note 7, to include § Sec.
351A (d). (The PHBPA amended the Public Health Service Act to enumerate the registration requirements
for persons working with Select Agents.)
33 PATRIOT Act, supra note 18.
34 For a list of the steps in applying for a Security Risk Assessment, see http://www.selectagents.gov/
sra.htmi (last visited Sept. 21, 2009).
35 Id. (Responsible Officials and Alternate Responsible Officials, as defined by statute, must renew every
three years. All other laboratory scientists must renew every five years.).
36 NAT'L SC. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, Enhancing Personnel Reliability among Individuals with
Access to Select Agents 7 (2009), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/meetings/200905T/NSABB
%20Final%20Report%20on%20PR%205-29-09.pdf.
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tuted formal Personnel Reliability Programs ("PRP") - a more extensive
screening process than that called for by the baseline, mandatory SRA -
which may include a number of the following: extensive background
checks, character references, security clearances, medical evaluations,
psychological testing, drug and alcohol testing, polygraph examinations,
credit checks and review of service or employment records.
One reason for the marked difference between the personnel screen-
ing measures used at military and non-military laboratories is that the PRP
programs in military facilities are remnants of surety programs developed
by the Department of Energy ("DOE") and DOD for research on chemical
and nuclear weapons.37 A culture of strict security has always been the
norm in these facilities and so the more invasive PRP procedures are not
generally considered to be an extreme hindrance to the recruitment and re-
tention of talented scientists. Conversely, most research on biological Se-
lect Agents is conducted in universities, which have a long history of
openness and international collaboration. To these institutions, the more
onerous PRP program elements might fundamentally change this cultural
norm of openness and inhibit the way university-level research is con-
ducted without sufficient evidence of improved reliability beyond that
which is possible from strict enforcement of the SRA process.38
3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
and National Institutes of Health ("NIH") Advisory Guidelines:
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, (5th ed.)
Advisory guidelines published by CDC and the NIH, Biosafety in
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories ("BMBL guidelines") de-
lineate biosafety and biosecurity protocols for laboratories depending on
the threat posed to laboratory staff and scientists as well as surrounding
communities.
37 Enhancing Personnnel Reliability Among Individuals with Access to Select Agents, Report of the Na-
tional Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, May 2009, at 5 available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecu-
rity/meetings/200905T/NSABB%2OFinal%20Report%20on%20PR%205-29-09.pdf
38 Id.
39 U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, The Nat'l Insts. of
Health, Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (final printing forthcoming 5th ed., U. S.
Gov't Printing Office, 2007) http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/. [hereinafter "BMBL guidelines"]. According to
the CDC and NIH, biosafety considerations include: "infectivity, severity of disease, transmissibility, and
the nature of the work being conducted" as well as the agent's origin. These are the "primary risk criteria
used to define the four ascending levels of containment, referred to as biosafety levels I through 4."
86
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a. Biosafety Level Designations:
The BMBL guidelines delineate four biosafety levels ("BSL") in or-
der of ascending levels of required containment. 40 At each level, an ap-
propriate containment procedure is prescribed with reference to specific
facility safeguards, safety equipment, and microbiological practices. BSL-
3 and BSL-4 protocols require heightened oversight of security procedure
because of the dangerous nature of the agents and toxins examined in
those facilities.4 1
1. Biosafety Level I is suitable for work involving well-
characterized agents not known to consistently cause disease
in immunocompetent adult humans and those which present a
minimal potential hazard to laboratory personnel and the en-
42
vironment.
2. Biosafety Level 2 builds upon BSL-1 protocols. BSL-2 desig-
nation is suitable for labs whose work involves agents that
pose moderate hazards to personnel and the environment.43
3. Biosafety Level 3 is applicable to clinical, diagnostic, teach-
ing, research, or production facilities where work is per-
formed with indigenous or exotic agents that may cause seri-
ous or potentially lethal disease through inhalation route
exposure.44 Examples of agents handled and stored in BSL-3
laboratories include Tuberculosis and St. Louis Encephalitis
virus.45 In addition to the standard microbiological practices
employed in BSL-1 and 2 laboratories, BSL-3 laboratories are
encouraged to control access to the facility, to decontaminate
all waste and laboratory clothing, to conduct all work with
agents in a Class I or II Biological Safety Cabinets (BSC), and
46to regulate air flow in and out of the laboratory.
40 Id. at 17.
41 The United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases located at Fort Detrick, MD
has a facility housing laboratories of both biosafety levels. Joe Pappalardo, Virus Hunters: Inside Mary-
land's New Biosafety Level 4 Lab, POPULAR MECHANICS, May 2009 available at: http://www.popular
mechanics.com/science/health-medicine/4315093.html?page=l ( "The outer area is the medical research
equivalent of a maximum-security prison- Biosafety Level 3. The inner sanctum is supermax or BSL-4.").
42 BMBL guidelines, supra note 40, at 41.
43 Id. at 44.
44 Id. at 49.
45 Id. at 37.
46 Id. at 50-56. Biological safety cabinets provide personnel, environmental and product protection through
air flow management and decontamination techniques.
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4. Biosafety Level 4 is required for work with dangerous and
exotic agents that pose a high individual risk of life-
threatening disease, that are contagious by aerosol transmis-
sion, or any related agents with unknown risks of transmis-
sion.47 Examples of these types of biological agents include:
foot and mouth disease; the Ebola virus; and smallpox. All
work with these agents must either be conducted in a "Suit
Laboratory" or a "Cabinet Laboratory" to protect the employ-
48
ees and the surrounding community from exposure.
b. Biosecurity Requirements
Biosecurity has been defined as protection of microbial agents from
49loss, theft, diversion, or intentional misuse.
Apart from the Select Agent regulations, there is no current federal
requirement for the development of a biosecurity program, as distinct from
a biosafety program at any of the BSL-1 through BSL-4 laboratories. 0
The Select Agent regulations require that a biosecurity plan exist, but they
do not establish the specific components of the plan. All biosafety and bio-
security measures not directly related to required registration or reporting
in biomedical and microbiological laboratories are principally governed by
the BMBL advisory guidelines."
The BMBL guidelines recommend that facilities engage in a two-part
approach to biosecurity considerations.5 First, the facility should conduct
a risk assessment to determine if it has any agents that require biosecurity
measures to prevent loss, theft, diversion, or intentional misuse." Sec-
47 Id. at 56.
48 Id. at 57. In a "Cabinet Laboratory" all handling of agents must be performed in a Class III BSC
whereas in a "Suit Laboratory" personnel must wear a positive pressure protective suit.*
49 Id. at 118.
50 Select Agent Regulations, supra note 24.
51 BMBL Guidelines, supra note 40.
52 See id. at 120. (stating "A risk management approach to laboratory biosecurity 1) establishes which, if
any, agents require biosecurity measures to prevent loss, theft, diversion, or intentional misuse, and 2) en-
sures that the protective measures provided, and the costs associated with that protection, are proportional
to the risk").
53 Id. at 121 ("[T]he entire risk assessment and risk management process may be divided into five main
steps, each of which can be further subdivided: 1) identify and prioritize biologicals and/or toxins; 2) iden-
tify and prioritize the adversary/threat to biologicals and/or toxins; 3) analyze the risk of specific security
scenarios; 4) design and develop an overall risk management program; 5) regularly evaluate the institu-
tion's risk posture and
protection objectives.").
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ondly, the facility should conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine if
the costs of additional precautions would be proportional to the risk of ex-
posure to the agents used and stored in the laboratories.54 The guidelines
ultimately establish ten elements that might be incorporated into a biose-
curity program, should a facility determine that it is necessary." The
BMBL guidelines are explicit in noting that the biosecurity program ele-
ments are not to be viewed as legally binding minimum standards or re-
quirements.
C. Ancillary Statutes and Regulations
Multiple departments and statues are involved in oversight of Select
Agents. This is due in part to fragmentation of the regulatory scheme re-
garding BSL laboratories and in part to the scope of operations which
could be involved in BSL research. In addition to the agencies aforemen-
tioned including DHS, DOD, HHS, USDA, NIH, and the CDC, other fed-
eral agencies also have some part in oversight of the movement and use of
biological agents in the U.S. or have BSL labs themselves. These include
the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Commerce, the De-
partment of State, the Department of Labor, the Department of the Interior,
the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Veterans'
56Affairs. While a comprehensive listing and review of each applicable
statute, regulation, and guidelines would be outside the scope of this arti-
cle, a few are listed below to illustrate the broad nature of potentially ap-
plicable law and practice.
1. NIH Guidelines For Research Involving Recombinant DNA
Molecules - April 2002 5
54 Id. at 120 ("Resources are not infinite. Biosecurity policies and procedures should not seek to protect
against every conceivable risk. The risks need to be identified, prioritized and resources allocated based on
that prioritization. Not all institutions will rank the same agent at the same risk level. Risk management
methodology takes into consideration available institutional resources and the risk tolerance of the institu-
tion.")
55 Id. at 123-27. The elements suggested for inclusion into a biosecurity program include: program man-
agement, physical security, personnel management, inventory and accountability, information security,
transport of biological agents, accident response plans, reporting and communication procedures, training
and practice drills, and security updates.
56 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-574, HIGH-CONTAINMENT LABORATORIES:
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR OVERSIGHT IS NEEDED, 9-10 (2009).
57 DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV'S, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH
INVOLVING RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES (2002) [hereinafter NIH GUIDELINES], available at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/rac/guidelines 02/NIH_Gdlines_2002prn.pdf
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2. Hazardous Materials Regulations 8
3. International transport regulations including those of Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, and the International Maritime
Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code5 9
4. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Produc-
tion and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on Their Destruction60
D. Recent Reported Incidents of
Non-Compliance At BSL Laboratories:
Select events are discussed below for illustrative purposes.
1. Anthrax: Fort Detrick
Bacillus anthracis ("Anthrax"), designated alternately as a BSL-2 or 3
agent depending on application, was the biopathogen responsible for five
deaths and increased fear regarding public safety when it was dispersed
though the United States Postal Service ("USPS") in 2001 .61 After nearly
seven years of investigation, there is substantial evidence that the origin of
the Anthrax mailings - and possibly the perpetrator - emanate from the
BSL laboratory at U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious
Diseases, Fort Detrick, Maryland ("USAMRIID").6 2 Dr. Bruce Ivins, an
Army researcher at USAMRIID, suspected in the attacks, committed sui-
cide before officially being charged. Because of Ivins' death, the govern-
ment will not be able to present its case in court. According to Assistant
Director in Charge Joseph Persichini at the FBI's Washington Field Of-
58 Hazardous Material Regulations, 49 C.F.R. §§171-180 (2009) (relating to the safe and secure transporta-
tion of hazardous materials in commerce).
59 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DANGEROUS GOODS CODE,
(2004), available at http://www.imo.org/Safety/mainframe.asp?topic-id=158#1. The implementation of
the Code is mandatory in conjunction with the obligations of the members of United Nation Government
under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78).
60 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Bio-
logical) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, March 25, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
Under the treaty, the Department of Commerce imposes export controls over certain microorganisms, tox-
ins, biological equipment, and related technology to further U.S. foreign policy interests in opposing the
proliferation and use of biological weapons.
61 Atlas, supra note 2, at 17.
62 Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Anthrax Investigation: Closing a Chapter
(Aug. 6, 2008), available at http://www.fbi.gov/page2/august08/amerithrax080608a.html; Press
Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Science Briefing on the Anthrax Investigation (Aug.
18, 2008), available at http://www.fbi.gov/page2/august08/anthraxscience-081808.html.
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fice, "Bruce Ivins was responsible for the death, sickness, and fear brought
to our country by the 2001 anthrax mailings." 63 There has been substantial
debate whether Dr. Ivins was the perpetrator. Irrespective of the guilt or
innocence of Dr. Ivins, strong scientific evidence has come forth that the
Anthrax strain used in the attacks came from the laboratory.
Of note, Dr. Bruce E. Ivins was cleared for his work with Anthrax at
Fort Detrick through the DOD's more onerous Personnel Reliability Pro-
gram security process.6 A lesson learned from the Anthrax attacks in Oc-
tober 2001 is that protocols to ensure the reliability of personnel can never
wholly eliminate the risk of misuse, loss or theft of dangerous biological
agents due to inherent human imperfection and inability to pre-screen an
individual's intent.65  Biosecurity must therefore now be deemed as im-
portant as biosafety in keeping employees and the public secure in terms
of malignant use of these agents.
2. Brucella: Texas A&M University
In April of 2007, the CDC reviewed Texas A & M University ("Texas
A & M") facilities and safet protocols and found that Texas A & M was
guilty of a dozen violations. The review was conducted after notification
from a source outside the university regarding a February 2006 occupa-
tional exposure to Brucella, a BSL-3 pathogen.67 The exposed lab worker
was experienced in handling M. tuberculosis ("TB") and had been trained
to work safely with that agent. However, the exposure occurred while
working with Brucella in a manner which would have proven safe with
TB. However, she was not trained to work with Brucella and the safety
procedures she applied were insufficient for this agent.68  Texas A & M
63 Id.
64 Bhattachajee, supra note 3, at 1283.
65 Kasper, supra note 9.
66 See e.g. Letter from Robbin Weyant, Director, Division of Select Agents and Toxins, Coordinating Of-
fice for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response, to Richard Ewing, Responsible Official, Texas
A&M University (Aug. 31, 2007) (Texas A & M violated multiple provisions of 42 C.F.R. § 73 (2007),
including §§ 73.7, 73.9, 73.10, 73.11, 73.12, 73.15, 73.17, and 79.19.) availabl at http://www.sunshine-
project.org/TAMU/CDCTAMUReport.pdf. See also Letter from Eddie J. Davis, Interim President, Texas
A&M University to John W. O'Brien, Senior Counsel, Office of Inspector General (Aug. 17, 2007) (on file
with authors).
67 Letter from John W. O'Brien, Senior Counsel, Office of Inspector General to Eddie J. Davis, Interim
President, Texas A & M University (July 18, 2007) (The CDC conducted a site visit of Texas A & M on
April 16 through 18, 2007 to review the events surrounding the exposure to Select Agent Brucella on Feb-
mary 9, 2006. The exposure occurred because a laboratory worker, who was working with Brucella, was
not trained to handle the agent.) (on file with authors).
68 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HIGH-CONTAINMENT BIOSAFETY LABORATORIES: PRELIMINARY
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violations included broad access to Select Agents by employees who were
not authorized to work with the agents, multiple biosafety infractions, and
69inadequate record keeping. In order to protect public health and safety,
the Director of the CDC ordered Texas A & M to stop all work with Select
Agents until they complied with the Select Agent regulations.70 In 2008, a
settlement agreement between the university and HHS culminated in pay-
ment of $1 million. Texas A & M ultimately accepted responsibility for
the lapses noted in the CDC investigation.7 '
3. Shigella: University of Texas at Austin
As a result of inquiry from NIH, University of Texas at Austin ("UT-
Austin") began to systematically review all laboratory incidents occurring
between 2000 and 2007.72 Thirteen laboratory incidents were assessed, in-
cluding five incidents of exposure to Shigella, a BSL-2 agent.73 All work-
ers recovered without incident. 74  As a result, UT-Austin thoroughly re-
vised laboratory policies and procedures, notably those relating to
surveillance, inspection, training, incident reporting and incident response.
The university also developed and implemented additional safety and
laboratory procedures.7 5
OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROLIFERATION OF BSL-3 AND BSL-4 LABORATORIES IN THE UNITED STATES:
STATEMENT OF KEITH RHODES (2007), at 19.
69 See e.g. Jennifer Couzin, Texas University Responds to Biosafety Complaints, SCIENCENOW DAILY
NEWS, Sept. 6, 2007, available at http://sciencenow.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/short/2007/906/1 (last ac-
cessed Sept. 21, 2009); U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., High Containment Biosafety Laboratories: Pre-
liminary Observations on the Oversight of the Proliferation of the BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories in the
United States, GAO-08-108T, 15-20 (Washington, D.C. Oct. 4 2007); Letter from Robbin Weyant, Direc-
tor, Division of Select Agents and Toxins, Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency
Response to Richard Ewing, Responsible Official, Texas A&M University (Aug. 31, 2007).
70 See e.g. Letter from Robbin Weyant, Director, Division of Select Agents and Toxins, Coordinating Of-
fice for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response to Richard Ewing, Responsible Official, Texas
A&M University (Aug. 31, 2007) (following a site visit by CDC representatives on June 30, 2007, the Di-
rector of the CDC extended the April 20, 2007 cease and desist order to include all work with Select
Agents and toxins at Texas A & M University until the problems were corrected and compliance with the
Select Agent regulations was achieved); Press Release, Texas A&M University, Vaccine Research Update
(Feb. 20, 2008), available at http://vaccineresearch.tamu.edulnews-release.html (last accessed Sept. 21,
2009) ( Texas A&M agreed to a $1 million settlement with the Office of the Inspector General at the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services).
71 Press Release, Texas A&M University, Vaccine Research Update (Feb. 20, 2008), available at
http://vaccineresearch.tamu.edu/news-release.html.
72 Press Release, University of Texas at Austin, Statement Concerning Laboratory Incident Review at The
University of Texas at Austin (Sept. 18, 2007), available at http://www.utexas.edulnews/2007/09/18/lab/
(last accessed Sept. 21, 2009).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. The procedures developed by the U. Texas at Austin included training, implementing a rapid re-
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4. Vaccina virus in Smallpox Research: Philadelphia
In Philadelphia, at an unnamed research institution, an immunology
graduate student was exposed to Vaccina, a BSL-2 agent 6 and developed
an eye infection resulting in her hospitalization.7 7 The review of the labo-
ratory practices revealed lax practices affording manifold opportunities for
virus exposure, including infrequent use of eye protection when working
with smallpox, failure to disinfect waste pipettes prior to their removal
from the biosafety cabinet, and removal of samples from the biosafety
cabinet for experiments and use in other parts of the facility.
5. Foot and Mouth Disease - Pirbright, UK
While not a US incident, this incident is an excellent example for the
necessity of facility maintenance, so it will be covered here.
In 2007, livestock infected with Foot and Mouth Disease, a highly in-
fectious BSL-4 agent, were discovered at several local farms near Pir-
bright in the UK.79  Investigation into high containment labs found evi-
dence of long term damage and leakage of the drainage system servicing
the site. Contaminated waste water leaching into soil then carried off-site
by vehicles via contaminated mud probably caused the resulting exposure.
The event cost taxpayers over E3 billion."0
E. Government Sponsored Reports:
As a result of one or more of the episodes described above, several
institutions conducted investigative studies to evaluate biosecurity risks.
We summarize some of the major studies below. The reports highlighted
have been selected to reflect key points that are raised in this article and
are not intended to be exhaustive of the literature on the issues.
sponse team to report incidents immediately, surveillance measures were upgraded, and the University's
Institutional Biosafety Committee was given more resources to ensure research is done safely.
76 The Vaccina virus is the "live virus" used in the smallpox vaccine. Dep't of Health and Human Serv's:
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Smallpox Fact Sheet: The Live Virus Smallpox Vaccine
(2002), http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/pdf/live-virus.pdf (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009).
77 Felicia Lewis, et al., Dispatch: Ocular Vaccinia Infection in Laboratory Worker, 12 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 134 (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/voll2no01/pdfs/05-
1126.pdf (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009).
78 Id.
79 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HIGH-CONTAINMENT BIOSAFETY LABORATORIES: PRELIMINARY
OBSERVATIONS ON THE OVERSIGHT OF THE PROLIFERATION OF BSL-3 AND BSL-4 LABORATORIES IN THE
UNITED STATES: STATEMENT OF KEITH RHODES (2007), at 22.
80 Id.
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1. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity:
Enhancing Personnel Reliability among
Individuals with Access to Select Agents"
In the October of 2008, the White House asked the NSABB82 to con-
sider whether a national Personnel Reliability Program ("PRP") should be
mandated for the nation's academic, government, and private research fa-
cilities that handle Select Agents." A PRP typically requires, at a mini-
mum, psychological testing, a national security clearance, and medical
testing. 4 In May 2009, NSABB produced a report recommending security
improvements at non-military research facilities whose employees have
access to Select Agents, but it explicitly rejected the need for promulgation
of a formal, national PRP mandate." The challenge before regulators, as
NSABB identified, is to address the risk of an "insider threat" to BSL-4
facilities without unduly hindering the pace of research on biological
agents that could be misused against the American public in a bioterrorist
attack. 86 NSABB concluded that a national PRP would have "unintended
and detrimental consequences for the scientific enterprise that in the future
could result in more harm to public health and safety and to national secu-
rity than an insider threat poses."
NSABB found that local institutions have significantly increased se-
curity protocols under the existing select agent program; that there is little
evidence that supports the predictive value of additional assessments of
81 Nat'l Sci. Advisory Bd. for Biosecurity, Report: Enhancing Personal Reliability Among Individuals
with Access to Select Agents, (May 20, 2009) ["NSABB Report"], available at:
http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/meetings/200905T/NSABB%20Final%2Report%20on%20PR%205-29-
09.pdf (last Sept. 21, 2009).
82 The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity is chartered by the Department of Health and
Human Services to "provide advice, guidance, and leadership regarding biosecurity oversight of dual use
research, defined as biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a
biologic threat to public health and/or national security." NSABB Report, supra note 82, at 1. NSABB ad-
vises the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Director of the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), and the heads of all federal departments and agencies that conduct or support
life science research. See 42 U.S.C. § 217a. The NSABB is governed by the provisions of the Federal Ad-
visory Committee Act, amended by Pub. L. 92-463, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(C), which sets forth standards for
the formation and use of advisory committees. Information about NSABB is available at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/aboutnsabb.html.
83 Bhattacharjee, supra note 3, at 1283.
84 NSABB Report, supra note 82, at 10-11.
85 Id. at 9. The final report was issued on May 29, 2009. ("Furthermore, as it considered the potential util-
ity of the various assessments commonly utilized in PRPs, it found little evidence to suggest that personnel
reliability assessments going beyond the SRA and other institutional background checks that are already in
place would correlate with, or effectively identify, an insider threat.").
86 Id. at 1.
87 Id. at v.
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individuals; and that institutional leadership is often the most effective
way to mitigate the risk of an "insider threat."88 NSABB specifically con-
sidered the merit of requiring facilities to use personnel reliability assess-
ments commonly used in laboratories affiliated with the Department of
Homeland Security and/or funded by the military, including psychological
testing, national security clearances, and medical examinations. 9 Due to
concerns over cost, efficacy, and deterrent effect, NSABB did not recom-
mend adopting any of these as mandates for facilities doing research on
Select Agents.90 NSABB ultimately recommended strengthening the SRA
procedure, institutional enhancement of a culture of responsibility and ac-
countability, and a reduction or stratification of the list of Select Agents.91
2. Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation
and Terrorism: World at Risk 92
Congress tasked The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Prolif-
eration and Terrorism ("The Commission") with assessing the Nation's ac-
tivities, initiatives and programs to prevent the proliferation weapons of
mass destruction and terrorism.93 The Commission focused its study on
those dangers that have been perceived as the greatest threats to national
security, namely biological and nuclear attacks. With regard to biological
threats, The Commission advanced many recommendations including
conducting "a comprehensive review of the domestic program to secure
dangerous pathogens" and tightening "government oversight of high-
containment laboratories."9 4 The Commission noted the absence of a
comprehensive regulatory framework and found that "no single entity in
the executive branch is responsible for overseeing and managing the risks
88 NSABB Report, supra note 82, at 8.
89 Id. at 9-10
90 Id.
91 NSABB Report, supra note 82, at 13-15.
92 Bob Graham, et. al, World at Risk: The Report of The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Prolif-
eration and Terrorism (Vintage Books: A Division of Random House, Inc. 2008) (Through House Resolu-
tion 1, Congress established the bipartisan Commission for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation and Terrorism to address the threat that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses
to the United States, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Public Law
110-53,§1851, 121 Stat. 266, 502. The Commission was directed to conduct an assessment of current ac-
tivities and programs related to the threat of proliferation and to make recommendations to strengthen pre-
ventive efforts.).
93 Id. at xi.
94 Id. at 27-28.
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associated with all the high-containment (BSL-3) laboratories operated by
the U.S. government, industry, or academia."s
3. Government Accountability Office: BIOSAFETY
LABORATORIES: Perimeter Security Assessment of the Nation's
Five BSL-4 Laboratories96
This GAO report issued in September 2008 specifically addressed pe-
rimeter security of five operational BSL-4 laboratories. Perimeter securit
was assessed pursuant to fifteen security controls that GAO identified.
GAO concluded that two of the five BSL-4 laboratories had significant
shortfalls in security controls that if operating as expected could preclude
unauthorized access, loss, or theft of select agents. 98 HHS commented on
this report noting that the CDC, in coordination with APHIS, will seek in-
put from relevant stakeholders about the need and advisability of Federal
regulation regarding specific perimeter controls.99
4. Government Accountability Office: HIGH CONTAINMENT
BIOSAFETY LABORATORIES: Preliminary Observations on the
Oversight of the Proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories in the
United States 2007100
This preliminary GAO report identifies lessons learned from past ex-
posure events and specifically raises the issue that no single federal agency
has an oversight mission; therefore, no single agency is accountable for
biosafety and biosecurity at all BSL labs. 11 The GAO concludes that re-
95 Id. at 25.
96 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., BIOSAFETY LABORATORIES: PERIMETER SECURITY ASSESSMENT
OF THE NATION'S FIVE BSL-4 LABORATORIES (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d081092.pdf (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009).
97 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 98, at 14. ("(1) Outer/tiered perimeter boundary; (2)
blast Stand-off area between lab and perimeter barriers; (3) barriers to prevent vehicles from approaching
lab; (4) loading docks located outside the footprint of the main building; (5) exterior windows do not pro-
vide direct access to lab; (6) command and control center; (7) CCTV monitored by the command and con-
trol center; (8) active intrusion detection system integrated with CCTV; (9) camera coverage for all exterior
lab building entrances; (10) perimeter lighting of the complex; (11) visible armed guard presence at all pub-
lic entrances to lab; (12) roving armed guard patrols of perimeter; (13) X-ray magnetometer machines in
operation at building entrances; (14) vehicle screening; and (15) visitor screening.")
98 Id.
99 Id. at 19.
100 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HIGH-CONTAINMENT BIOSAFETY LABORATORIES: PRELIMINARY
OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROLIFERATION OF BSL-3 AND BSL-4 LABORATORIES IN THE UNITED STATES:
STATEMENT OF KEITH RHODES (2007).
101 Id. at 7.
96
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porting barriers must be overcome in order to enhance biosafety though
shared learning from past mistakes and to assure the public that accidents
are examined and contained. 102 This report also emphasizes the critical
importance of facility maintenance in preventing environmental exposure
and contamination as clearly demonstrated in the Pirbright exposure. o0
This report was followed by the recently released report summarized be-
low.
5. Government Accountability Office: HIGH-CONTAINMENT
LABORATORIES: National Strategy for Oversight is Needed104
In its most recent report on the issue of biosecurity at BSL laborato-
ries, GAO was asked to address the proliferation of high-containment
laboratories, to describe which federal agency was tracking and overseeing
this expansion, and to comment on lessons learned from highly publicized
incidents involving bioagents.'os The report concludes that because no
single federal agency has the authority or the mandate to track the expan-
sion of all high-containment laboratories, no agency knows the precise
number of high-containment labs currently in the United States or under
development. 1
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The regulatory structure for BSL level 3 and 4 laboratories is frag-
mented across several federal agencies. The PHBPA and the ABPA grant
oversight for Select Agents to the HHS and USDA respectively.10 7 Addi-
tionally Select Agents, which overlap the human, animal, and plant cate-
gories because of their potential to impact various species, can be regis-
tered with either agency.10 8 Recombinant DNA research is additionally
covered by NIH guidelines.109 Depending on the nature of the research or
use of the agent, multiple other agencies and regulations may also be in-
volved.
102 Id. at 7-8.
103 Id. at 23.
104 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HIGH-CONTAINMENT LABORATORIES: NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
OVERSIGHT IS NEEDED, GAO-09-574 (September 21, 2009).
105 Id. at 1
106 Id. at 2.
107 PHBPA, supra note 7.
108 ABPA, supra note 22.
109 NIH Guidelines For Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules - April 2002, avail-
able at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/index.html (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009).
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One federal agency should provide oversight for laboratories handling
BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs. The CDC and APHIS are given similar oversight
responsibilities under the PHBPA; however, it is apparent that the DHHS,
through the CDC, may be in a better position to enforce the Select Agent
regulations as primary regulator. In recent testimony to Congress, the In-
spector General of the USDA, reported that APHIS still had not ensured
that entities were fully complying with regulations regarding security
plans, restricting access to select agents, training individuals authorized to
possess, use, or transfer the agents, or maintaining current and accurate in-
ventories.o The CDC, under DHHS oversight, appears to have a more
developed Select Agent enforcement program, as evidenced by thirteen
enforcement suits brought between 2004 and 2009."' Consolidating over-
sight into one federal agency does not necessarily preclude the beneficial
collaboration that is now in place. For example, the FBI, through CJIS,
should still be integrally involved in performing the background check
component of the Security Risk Assessment because that is within its field
of expertise and is more efficient than another federal agency independ-
ently developing those procedures.
Incident reporting of biosafety and biosecurity incidents at BSL-3 and
BSL-4 laboratories is not centralized. Again, oversight for select agents is
assigned to the HHS and USDA respectively. 112 Additionally agents that
overlap categories can be registered with either agency.113 Incident report-
ing for BSL-3 non-Select Agents is not required, though laboratories such
as those at UMB do track incidents regarding non-select agents internally.
One federal agency, charged with oversight, should receive all reports of
incidents of loss, theft, or misuse regarding BSL-3 and 4 labs, regardless
of whether a Select or non-select Agent is involved.
Incident review does not produce protocol modification in a timely
manner across all laboratories, thereby inhibiting collaboration on best
practices. Incidents should be reported promptly to one centralized agency
for BSL-3 and 4 laboratories. Reports should be regularly reviewed on a
110 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., SOUTHEAST REGION, AUDIT REPORT ANIMAL AND
PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SELECT AGENT OR
TOxIN REGULATIONS PHASE II REPORT, REPORT NO. 33601-3-AT (Wash. D.C. Jan. 2006), at 4, available
at http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/33601-3-AT.pdf (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009). In subsequent audit
reports to Congress in fiscal years 2007-2009, the Inspector General did not address the Select Agent Pro-
gram.
II I U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV'S, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS,
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/cmp/agents-toxins.asp (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009).
112 PHBPA, supra note 7.
113 ABPA, supra note 22.
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timely basis. The review should not be punitive in nature and should be
geared towards improving security and safety across labs. The review
should be expeditiously shared with all BSL-3 and 4 institutions, so that
investigators working with these agents can learn from each other and
share solutions in an organized manner.
Physical BSL laboratory facilities do not require accreditation. Each
laboratory is subject to inspection and site visits to assess compliance with
the Select Agent regulations.114 The Pirbright incident demonstrated that
beyond initial design and construction, ongoing facility maintenance plays
a critical role in ensuring the safety and security of high exposure labs
over time."' This is critical to preventing environmental exposure and the
spread of disease. Each laboratory facility should be accredited to assure
uniform standards for biosafety and biosecurity across institutions. Ac-
creditation should require periodic review and assessment.
Protocols that are in place to gauge personnel reliability can be im-
proved. There is great interest in increasing personnel reliability within
research laboratories. However, some current compliance measures may
be compromising the social benefits gained from investigation of the Se-
lect Agents because of onerous screening measures for personnel. This
may have a deterrent effect on potential hires. Practical improvements to
improve personnel reliability should be implemented.
For instance, the oversight agency might focus on improving the SRA
to achieve more stringent screening, while not imposing the onerous proc-
ess of a formal PRP. This improvement is aligned with the recommenda-
tions of the NSABB.' 16 The informal practice of checking the names of
individuals with favorable SRAs against the Counterterrorism Watchlist
and other FBI databases, already occurring about every six months, should
be formally incorporated into the SRA process through regulation. The
oversight agency should insist that all responses, whether affirmative or
negative, to questions asking about past criminal conduct, substance abuse
and mental illness should precipitate further inquiry through character ref-
erences or discussion with the prospective employee.
The NSABB also identified optimal personnel characteristics that
should be considered for candidates for employment in high containment
114 42 C.F.R. § 73.18 (2009) (relating to public health); See also 9 C.F.R. § 121.16 (2009) (relating to
animals); See also 7 C.F.R. § 331.18 (2009) (relating to plants).
115 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 102, at 23.
116 NSABB Report, supra note 82, at 11-12.
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labs.' 17 Research on the reliability and practicality of assessing for these
characteristics should be undertaken and the accreditation process should
be adapted to the results of that research.
The "one-size fits all" model of compliance is too great a burden on
most non-military level laboratories. Military laboratories have height-
ened security models, but military level security is not practical for univer-
sity campuses. A private sector model of appropriate and practical biose-
curity procedures for those BSL laboratories is needed.
Military institutions have fully developed security models in place
that are not practical for the private sector. A non-military model is
needed for BSL-3 and 4 biosecurity. An ideal model of this sort would
take into account the need for integrating biosecurity measures with the
open educational nature of university campuses. Research is needed to as-
sess what additional steps may be needed to secure private sector BSL-4
laboratories, which are few in number." 8
The GAO perimeter report assessed BSL-4 labs based on perimeter
security parameters alone. Fifteen parameters were chosen based on
"GAO experience."' 1 9 Research is necessary to validate the GAO's pe-
rimeter security parameters. Additional security parameters should also be
assessed and their implementation benefit weighed against additional ex-
pense. Validated measures for improving BSL security will help in the
development of future security model development.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that Congress should enact legislation that will: (1) re-
place the present fragmented federal agency oversight system for biosafety
laboratories by creating consolidated oversight responsibilities within a
single agency; (2) through this agency, establish an accreditation system
for BSL laboratories to ensure that they are operated safely and securely;
(3) establish a reporting system that ensures that all laboratory mishaps are
promptly reported to, and promptly reviewed by, the oversight agency so
117 Id. at 8. (The optimal personnel characteristics are: no felony convictions, no domestic or international
terrorist ties, no history of scientific or professional misconduct in the workplace, emotional stability and
capacity for sound judgment, positive attitude toward safety and security measures, and standard operating
procedures, and free of vulnerability to coercion.).
118 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., BIOSAFETY LABORATORIES: PERIMETER SECURITY ASSESSMENT
OF THE NATION'S FIVE BSL-4 LABORATORIES (2008), at 4, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d081092.pdf (last accessed Sept. 21, 2009).
119 Id. at 7.
100
2010] GOVERNANCE AND BIOSECURITY 101
that the facts pertaining to these mishaps can be made available in a mean-
ingful way to other laboratories in a "lessons learned" modality; (4) im-
prove the process of personnel reliability assessments; and (5) recognize
that a "one-size fits all" model of compliance is too great a burden on most
non-military BSL laboratories, and thus foster a private sector model of
strong, but appropriate and practical, biosecurity procedures for those BSL
labs.
The task at hand is sweeping as it requires reorganization of a regula-
tory scheme that involves almost a dozen federal agencies. However, it is
crucial that this important scientific research be conducted in the safest
and most secure manner possible.

